This essay has been edited and improved from a coursework paper.

INTRODUCTION

In the pursuit of gender equality and women’s emancipation, the challenge of reconciling traditional cultural values with modern feminist ideas has sparked considerable debate. Confucianism, a predominant ethical and philosophical system in East Asia, has faced criticism for perpetuating patriarchal norms and impeding women’s rights progress. Yet, is the complete abandonment of Confucianism truly the key to women’s liberation, or can this ancient tradition be reformed and integrated into feminist thought? I argue that Confucian feminism is not only feasible but also possesses the potential to offer valuable insights and contributions to the global feminist discourse. Through this paper, my aim is to demonstrate that Confucian feminism presents a unique and powerful perspective capable of addressing complex issues surrounding gender equality and enriching the ongoing global conversation on feminism.

This paper will be divided into two parts to thoroughly investigate the potential of Confucian feminism. The first part will discuss the limitations of completely discarding Confucian values and traditions for achieving gender equality. This section will emphasize the importance of understanding the cultural and historical context of Confucianism, particularly in China and Korea. The second part will concentrate on rectification, reinterpretation, and the integration of Confucianism and feminism. I will explore key tenets through the original Confucian classics to identify areas of common ground. I will also explore the potential of merging the Confucian concept of Ren with care ethic as an example of how Confucian feminism can contribute to and expand upon existing feminist ethical theories.

By structuring the paper in this manner, I aim to provide a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the relationship between Confucianism and feminism, highlighting the potential of a Confucian feminist perspective to make valuable contributions to the global feminist discourse.

ABOLISHING CONFUCIANISM? A REFUTATION OF THREE SCHOLARS

In this section, I will examine the views that primarily call for the abolishment of Confucianism in order to achieve gender equality. I will discuss the arguments presented by He-Yin Zhen, Yun Chi Ho, and Julia Kristeva, and analyze their critiques of Confucianism in relation to women’s liberation.

In her work “On the Revenge of Women,” He critiques Confucianism as an instrument of male tyrannical rule, enabling men to uphold a hierarchy of superior men and inferior women (He 146). She argues that the “rites and propriety” promoted by Confucian scholars serve to subjugate women, concluding that a complete abandonment of Confucianism is necessary for women’s liberation (He 135). Similarly, Korean feminist Yun Chi Ho attributes the crisis in Korea to Confucian philosophy, which he believes contains the seeds of corruption and perpetuates oppressive gender relations (Choi 38). Julia Kristeva, in “About Chinese Women,” contends that feudalism and Confucianism were used to impose maximum patriarchal authority in China, with the traditional Confucian family structure being one of the chief obstacles to women’s liberation (Kristeva 80).

While these critics present compelling arguments for the rejection of Confucianism, I contend that their approaches are flawed as they commit two crucial mistakes. The first mistake is that by making Confucianism the sole culprit for all problems related to gender inequality, they ignore other significant economic, social, and cultural factors beyond the tenets of Confucianism.

For example, in the context of China’s feminist movement in the early 20th century, Henrik Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House had a significant impact, with Nora’s escape from the house being treated by Chinese feminists as a symbol of rebellion against the patriarchal clan system prescribed by Confucianism (Yan 356). Many feminist scholars at that time considered Nora’s walking out a success in achieving women’s liberation. However, Lu Xun, a scholar contemporary to He, offers a different interpretation of the play’s ending. Lu questions what happens after Nora leaves her home, suggesting that she has only two options: to fall into degradation (prostitution) or to return home (Lu, 257). Lu emphasizes the importance of economic and material factors, arguing that a liberated mind alone cannot overcome the challenges Nora would face after leaving her home. While women escape from home with hope and belief, they find that these hopes cannot be realized in a society where feudalism still exists but capitalism is not fully developed.

Drawing on this analysis, I argue that while Confucianism has indeed been criticized for its patriarchal aspects, simply rejecting it does not automatically guarantee women’s liberation. Other cultural, economic, and political factors can also contribute to the oppression of women. Therefore, a more comprehensive approach is needed that takes into account multiple factors that impact women’s rights and freedoms, rather than solely focusing on the rejection of Confucianism.

The second mistake that critics like He, Yun, and Kristeva make is advocating for the complete abandonment of Confucianism as a solution to gender inequality. Yun views Christianity as the replacement for Confucianism, stating that “Christianity is the salvation and hope of Korea “(Choi 36). Meanwhile, in her work “On the Question of Women’s Liberation,” He presents an anarcha-feminist solution, which calls for the abolition of all Confucian and capitalist systems. This approach, which follows their initial mistake of attributing all gender inequality issues to Confucianism, is neither meaningful nor practical. To support my argument, I will provide a historical analysis, focusing on the example of the Cultural Revolution in China and the removal of the “four olds.”

The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) aimed to eliminate feudal and bourgeois influences, including Confucianism, by destroying the “four olds” — customs, cultures, habits, and ideas. Although intended to create a more egalitarian society, the outcome was far from its original goal, leading to the decay of public morality in contemporary China. According to Chu and Ju, the Cultural Revolution uniquely contributed to the decay of social trust, as friends and family members betrayed each other (Chu and Ju 283). They argue that growing up in a cultural vacuum, with neither traditional nor new values to guide them, may have done more damage to young Chinese than the impact of value denunciation their parents endured (Chu and Ju 300). This moral decay might have been mitigated if Confucian rituals and teachings were still in place to guide interpersonal relationships and social behavior.

Thus, I argue that the abolishment of Confucianism would lead to the loss of the moral foundation and cultural roots that have shaped societal values, customs, traditions, social interactions, and interpersonal relationships in countries like China and Korea. With Confucianism deeply ingrained in their culture and history, disregarding it could result in a loss of self-identity, as it would disconnect people from their shared cultural heritage. This loss can manifest on national, social, and personal levels, as individuals grapple with the disintegration of the values and traditions that once defined their identity and provided a sense of belonging and purpose.

Therefore, for countries like China and Korea, where Confucianism is deeply rooted, the importance and necessity of a reconciling approach become apparent. Instead of entirely discarding Confucianism, these countries could benefit from reinterpreting and adapting certain aspects of Confucianism to align with contemporary values such as gender equality and individual freedom. By doing so, they can preserve the positive aspects of their cultural heritage while addressing the issues of gender inequality that stem from traditional Confucian teachings. In the next part of this paper, I will discuss the strategy that can be applied to address the issues of feminism and gender equality.

RECTIFICATION, REINTERPRETATION, AND INTEGRATION: AN APPROACH TO RECONCILIATION

In the previous section, I argued that a reconciling approach between Confucianism and feminism is necessary, as a complete abandonment of Confucianism is not practical. To facilitate this reconciliation, I propose a three-stage approach: rectification, reinterpretation, and integration. However, before embarking on these processes, we must address two critical inquiries: to what extent is Confucianism inherently sexist? How can we account for the presence of sexist passages or concepts within certain Confucian texts?

Cheng Yang Li, in his book “The Sage and Second Sex,” contends that sexism became characteristic of Confucianism sometime after Confucius and Mencius died. The Han Confucian master Dong Zhongshu maintained that, between the two principles governing the universe, yang and yin, yang is superior, and yin is inferior. Dong’s views were later developed and amplified by Song-Ming Neo-Confucians like Zhu Xi, who advocated the “Three Bonds,” asserting the ruler’s authority over the minister, the father’s over the son, and the husband’s over the wife. These views then became institutionalized, leading to oppressive practices like foot binding and chaste widowhood, which placed significant pressure on women (Li, 4).

Thus, it is important to note that these sexist interpretations of Confucianism do not necessarily reflect the original teachings of Confucius and Mencius. According to Li, Confucianism without later modifications deserves the name of Confucianism, and oppressing women is not an essential characteristic of the philosophy founded by Confucius and Mencius (Li 34). This distinction highlights that Neo-Confucianism is just one branch of Confucian development, and other interpretations are possible. For example, the Qing Confucian scholar Wang Chuanshan developed a Yin-Yang cosmology that emphasized the relative opposition and complementary nature of yin and yang in the universe (Liu 325). While Wang did not explicitly make a gender equality argument, by applying his ideas, we can envision a form of Yin-Yang cosmology that promotes balance and harmony between the genders. This interpretation demonstrates that alternative, non-sexist interpretations of Confucianism exist and can be further explored.

Rectification

By examining the development of Confucianism and identifying when and how sexist ideas were introduced or became more prominent, we arrive at the first stage, rectification. Rectification involves distinguishing between the original teachings of Confucianism and the later sexist interpretations. It also requires focusing primarily on the original texts and teachings of pre-Qin scholars such as Confucius and Mencius, as well as their works, the Analects and Mencius, for their ungendered approaches towards virtue, ethics, and values. The process of rectification is essential to pave the way for reinterpretation and integration with feminist ideas. By carefully examining the historical development of Confucian thought and identifying instances where sexist interpretations were introduced or amplified, we can work towards a more inclusive understanding of Confucianism that aligns with feminist values.

Reinterpretation

Having demonstrated that Confucianism is not a monolithic and static philosophical tradition, but rather one open to various interpretations throughout its development, we can explore different adaptations of Confucianism. Some scholars argue that it can be reinterpreted to be more compatible with modern feminist values.

For instance, Li seeks to establish a connection between humaneness^[1] and the ethics of care. To do so, he emphasizes the love and care aspects of humaneness, arguing that both humaneness and care focus on the tender aspects of human relatedness (Li 24). While this interpretation holds some truth, Li does not extensively emphasize the connection between humaneness and ritual^[2], opting instead for an interpretation that highlights certain aspects of Confucian concepts to establish a stronger connection with feminist philosophy. This approach suggests that Li prioritizes exploring the nuanced and relational aspects of humaneness, focusing less on the more rigid and formal dimension associated with ritual. By doing so, Li aims to bridge Confucian thought with feminist philosophy, emphasizing values such as empathy and care. Li’s treatment of humaneness can be viewed as a form of reinterpretation. As the discussion of humaneness and care ethics will be explored in greater detail in the next stage, let us consider another example of reinterpretation.

Another well-known and controversial passage on women in the Analects is the following: ” It is the women and the inferior men that are difficult to deal with. If you let them get too close, they become insolent. If you keep them at a distance, they complain.”^[3]

Although this passage has traditionally been interpreted as evidence for Confucius holding sexist views, I argue that an alternative interpretation is possible, one that does not degrade women. According to the passage, Confucius encountered difficulties in managing relationships with both groups. Nevertheless, the causes of these difficulties could be entirely distinct for each group. Confucius’ struggle with inferior individuals might originate from their hypocrisy and arrogance, which could provoke conflicts when he becomes too close to them, as demonstrated on numerous occasions in the Analects. Conversely, the rationale behind Confucius’ perception of women as difficult to interact with remains ambiguous, as he did not explicitly elaborate on this matter in the Analects. Consequently, it would be unwarranted to assume that the reasons are identical to those of inferior individuals.

The possibility arises that Confucius found it difficult to understand women because they possess greater emotional complexity than men. This stronger emotional intricacy and capability, however, can be seen as the foundation for care ethics, which emphasizes the significance of relational and emotional connections. Therefore, this passage might be seen as a starting point leading to feminist ethics of care.

All in all, the reinterpretation stage is instrumental in reconciling Confucianism and feminism by facilitating a reevaluation of traditional Confucian concepts. The next stage follows closely, which involves the synthesis of these reinterpreted concepts with contemporary feminist theories, further bridging the gap between Confucianism and feminism.

Integration

While the reinterpretation and integration stages are structurally separated in my essay, they often function as a coherent process and should be treated as such. Integration pertains to the amalgamation of Confucian and feminist philosophies, with the objective of elevating both to more advanced levels of understanding. This is achieved by broadening the scope of each philosophy to encompass a more diverse range of situations and perspectives, ultimately creating a more comprehensive and inclusive ethical framework.

For example, when examining the Confucian concept of humaneness through the lens of care ethics, the importance of emotional connections in discerning the needs of others is emphasized. Mencius posits that witnessing a child in peril evokes feelings of alarm and compassion, which stem from our capacity to empathize with the emotions of others. These feelings serve as the foundation of humaneness. While some scholars, such as Daniel Star, contend that care ethics are more flexible and contextual in comparison to the Confucian ethics of humaneness (Star 85), the fundamental care-oriented components of both philosophies exhibit striking similarities.

However, Nel Noddings, a prominent American philosopher who developed the theory of care ethics, articulates that care ethics suggest a limitation on our obligations (Noddings 107); we cannot extend care to everyone, which implies that our obligations are more significant towards those with whom we have a connection. Noddings accentuates the relational nature of care ethics, concentrating on individuals with whom we have formed close relationships. Critics have raised concerns that, in the absence of a broader sense of justice, care ethics might foster cronyism and favoritism (Friedman 61-67). However, through integration with Confucianism, care ethics can potentially address these criticisms and evolve into a universal moral theory that transcends intimate relationships and gender distinctions. Building on the ideas of Confucius, Mencius argues that promoting humanity does not require the denial of our natural inclinations or the pursuit of impartiality. Rather, we must extend our natural preferences to others, empathizing with individuals who harbor similar feelings towards their family members. Thus, it merely necessitates that we progress one step further, expanding respect and tenderness to not only our own kin but also to elders and young individuals in other families. ^[4] By connecting care ethics and Confucianism in this manner, we can create a more comprehensive ethical framework that addresses the limitations of both philosophies while providing a broader foundation for moral action. The culmination of this synthesis results in a universal socio-political theory that envelops various aspects of social life. Consequently, care is not solely an individual or gender-specific matter, but rather an all-encompassing ethical ideal and institutional arrangement that engages the nation, society, and individuals.

It is important to note that the analysis provided above offers a simplified version of the integration between care ethics and Confucianism. Humaneness, as a central concept in Confucianism, is broad and intricate, and the comparison with care ethics only captures a small portion of its complexity. Consequently, a more in-depth analysis would be necessary to fully understand the potential integration between these two ethical theories.

Moreover, the integration of care ethics and humaneness is just one example of reinterpretation and integration. Numerous other approaches exist that utilize this process. For instance, Rosenlee, her essay “Confucian friendship (You 友) as spousal relationship: a feminist imagination”, draws a connection between Confucian friendship and modern-day marriage, while Ivanhoe, in his essay “Mengzi, Xunzi, and Modem Feminist Ethics”, identifies Mencius’s and Xun Zi’s ethical theories with two variations of contemporary feminist ethical theory. Both Confucianism and feminism are broad, rich, and intricate disciplines, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution that can settle the disputes and connections between them. Exploring various aspects of reinterpretation and integration can further our understanding of these disciplines and enable the development of more comprehensive ethical frameworks that draw upon the strengths of both philosophies.

CONCLUSION

It has been shown that the development of Confucian feminism holds significant potential, particularly in countries like China and Korea where Confucian traditions have had a profound impact on social and ethical norms. Through a process of rectification, reinterpretation, and integration, Confucian feminism can emerge as a powerful force that enriches feminist ethical theories and provides unique insights grounded in the rich history of Confucian philosophy. Humaneness and care ethics serves as an example of how these two ethical frameworks can be synthesized, but it is important to remember that this is just one of many possible approaches. Confucian feminism offers a valuable perspective that can contribute to addressing complex issues related to gender equality and help advance the global conversation on feminism. By engaging in this dialogue and exploring the interplay between Confucian and feminist thought, we can work towards a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of both philosophies that can guide us in addressing the challenges of the modern world.

REFERENCES

Zhen, He-Yin. “On the Revenge of Women.” The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory, edited by Lydia H. Liu, Rebecca E. Karl, and Dorothy Ko, Columbia University Press, 2013, pp. 105-146.

Choi, Hyaeweol. “Gender Equality, a New Moral Order.” Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Ways, University of California Press, 2009, pp. 21-44.

Kristeva, Julia. “Confucius – An Eater of Woman.” About Chinese Women. Marion Boyars Publishers Ltd, 1986, pp. 66-99.

Yan, Yuheng. “A Study of the Influence of a Doll’s House on Chinese ‘Women walk out’ Literature.” Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, vol. 594, 2021, pp. 354-357.

Lu, Xun. “What Happens after Nora Walks Out 娜拉走後怎樣.” Jottings under Lamplight, edited by Eileen J. Cheng and Kirk Denton, Harvard University Press, 2017, pp. 256-261.

Chu, Godwin C., and Yanan Ju. The Great Wall in Ruins: Communication and Cultural Change in China. State University of New York Press, 1993.

Li, Chenyang. The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender. Open Court, 2000.

Li, Chenyang. “Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care.” The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, Open Court, 2000, pp. 23-42.

Liu, Jeeloo. “Is Human History Predestined in Wang Fuzhi’s Cosmology?” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 3, September 2001, pp. 321-337.

Confucius. The Analects (Lun yü). Translated with an introduction by D.C. Lau. Penguin Books, 1979.

Star, Daniel. “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li.” Hypatia, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter 2002, pp. 77-106. Published by Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.

Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. University of California Press, 1984.

Friedman, Marilyn. “Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender.” Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, edited by Virginia Held, Westview Press, 2006, pp. 61-77.

Mencius. Translated by D.C. Lau. Mencius. Penguin Classics, 1970.

1. This word is translated from the Chinese character ren 仁. ↑
2. This word is translated from the Chinese character Li 禮. ↑
3. ‘唯女子與小人爲難養也。近之則不孫、遠之則怨’, Analect, 17.25; Lau, p. 253. ↑
4. This interpretation is based on Mencius 1A:7, where the phrase “老吾老、以及人之老幼吾幼。以及人之幼天下可運於掌” is particularly relevant; Lau, p. 53. ↑